

were handled seems to indicate that the investigation process was used by the Communists as a device to suit their own convenience. In Heng-yang (Hunan Province), Ch'ao-chou, and Swatow (Kwangtung Province) Administrative Districts, there were 5,865 cases investigated and disposed of in a very short time.¹² Before the "trials" took place, the usual Communist pattern of holding mass meetings had been called in 315 villages in the Shang-jao Administrative District, Kiangsi Province alone.¹³ Some 120,000 people participated in such meetings.

3. Roundup of Saboteurs

Scattered cases of sabotage have been reported in the Communist press from time to time. It is hard to determine if any organized groups of saboteurs were at work, but the Communist provincial governors and Public Security Bureau chiefs alike blamed all cases involving sabotage on "counter-revolutionaries." These "criminals," the Communists said, burned granaries, killed draft animals, in order to disrupt farm production, and ambushed Communist militia in the countryside so as to create unrest in rural areas. In the four months beginning October 1950, a total of 4,371 cases of sabotage were reported in the rural communities of Central-South China.¹⁴

The Communists paid particular attention to sabotage in factories. Severe penalties were imposed on those charged with destruction of factory equipment,

12. Ibid., July 27, 1951, p. 3.

13. Ibid., August 22, 1951, p. 3.

14. See report by Pu Sheng-kuang, head of Public Security Department of the Military and Political Committee, Central-South China Region, in Yangtze Daily, April 17, 1951, p. 1.

those who spread rumors to demoralize the workers, and those who organized strikes. At the launching of the First Five-Year Plan in 1953, labor discipline was tightened up and security committees were strengthened in all factories. These measures, however, failed to eliminate sabotage in factories. As late as May 1955, a strike which disrupted industrial production in that area and brought death to two of the strike organizers, was reported in Wuhan.¹⁵ Another report said that from 1949 to 1954, cases of sabotage in factories and business enterprises in ten major cities in China totaled 11,094. Of these, 7,278 were discovered before major damage was done; 2,039 were serious cases involving industrial accidents caused by saboteurs; the remaining cases involved destruction and/or theft of factory equipment.¹⁶

4. Extirpation of Spies

The arrest and execution of many people accused of being Kuomintang intelligence agents were widely publicized. Such people included the former personnel of Nationalist intelligence organizations, government agencies, and officers of the Nationalist armed forces. Cases involving former members of a joint Sino-American intelligence agency during World War II were given special publicity. Take the case involving I P'ing-chen and Liu Ming-hsia, for example.¹⁷ Both had received training in intelligence work in the United States during the war. It

15. Shih Ch'eng-chih, "I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien Ta-lu Jen-min Ti Fan-K'ang" ["The People's Opposition to Communism on the Mainland in 1954"], Tsue-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], No. 106, January 10, 1955, pp. 61-63.

16. People's Daily, Peking, Sept. 30, 1954, p. 6.

17. Yangtze Daily, March 21, 1951, p. 1.

Some of the Communist press reports have indicated that the Communist work on the organization of trade unions in Central-South China has not been without its difficulties. According to the Communists, both the leaders of the trade unions and the rank and file of the working class seemed unable to understand fully the significance of the "new democracy." The union cadres adopted a "closed door" policy, excluding most of the technicians, ordinary employees, and temporary workers from the trade-union organization. As to the workers, they had not enough confidence in those who led them. For instance, some shop clerks in Kaifeng instead of asking help from their trade union, negotiated directly with the owner of the shop for a wage raise without notifying their union. They thought that the union was a nuisance rather than a help. Workers still did not realize that they were "masters of the nation."⁷ 467

It was a lack of "democratic spirit" on the part of the trade-union leadership as much as political awakening on the part of the working class that inspired the "Democratic Reform" Movement in the Central-South region about the middle of 1950.

II. LABOR DISPUTES

In a speech delivered by Teng Tzu-hui on the occasion of the formal opening of the Office of the Preparatory Committee of the Central-South 468 •

7. Workers' Daily, Oct. 5, 1950, p. 1.

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Federation of Trade Unions in July 1950, the relation between labor and capital (or management in the case of public enterprises) was defined. According to Teng, in the Communist society, labor and capital (or management) perform different functions but strive for the same goal, i.e., increase of production; therefore, labor disputes should not be allowed to develop into strikes, sabotage or lock-outs which would disturb production. All labor disputes in publicly-owned or privately-owned enterprises should be resolved in accordance with the interests of both labor and capital or management.⁸

The first step toward settling labor disputes is consultation between the trade union and the owner in the case of privately-owned enterprises, and between the trade union and the management in the case of publicly-owned enterprises. If consultation fails, the disputes may be brought to the Labor Bureau for mediation or arbitration. A labor bureau is established at all levels of local government.

The agency for settling labor disputes in publicly-owned enterprises was the Factory Administration Committee, on which labor and management were represented. By the end of 1949, in the Wuhan area of Hupeh Province, seven of the public utility companies, such as telecommunications, the post office, and water supply, established factory administration committees. In March of 1950, the

8. Tsu-kuo chou-k'an [China Weekly], Jan. 26, 1953, p. 10.

Wuchang No. 1 Cotton Mill, a privately-owned enterprise, ventured to establish a Labor-Capital Consultation Council to tackle labor disputes and other problems of production. Labor and capital were equally represented in the council. In other privately owned cotton mills in Wuhan, collective contracts were signed between labor and capital to settle disputes.⁹ 468

In Canton, there were many cases of labor disputes reported in cotton mills, rubber factories, and cigarette-manufacturing companies in 1949. Within the four months between January and April, 1950, the Labor Bureau of the Canton People's Government handled 72 cases involving labor disputes.¹⁰ In the provinces of Honan, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Kwangsi, where industrial development had lagged behind in comparison with Wuhan and Canton, the settlement of labor disputes more or less followed the old tradition and were handled by the local trade unions.

According to a Communist report from Hupeh, the trade union leadership in that province made some mistakes in handling relations between labor and capital. In some cases, the local People's Government and the Party workers organized without any authority production management committees in privately-owned enterprises. They took over the control of finance and production, although they had no experience in running factories. This mistake of Party leadership led to the closing of some factories and to the increase of unemployment and

9. Workers' Daily, Jan. 19, 1950, p. 1, and March 4, 1950, p. 1.

10. Compendium of Government Reports, p. 804.

caused bad feelings among workers toward the Party in Hupeh.¹¹ This state of affairs had been common in other parts of the country but was avoided in later stages of the labor movement. 468

III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AMONG THE WORKING CLASS

In the course of organizing the Chinese working class in 1949 and 1950, the Communists discovered that "reactionary elements" were still active in factories and mines and on wharves and docks. Some of these "reactionary elements" were organizers of secret societies such as the I-kuan-tao [the Unity Society], the Chiu-kung-tao [the Nine Palace Society], the Hung-pang [the Red Society], and the Ch'ing-pang [the Green Society]; others were alleged to be Nationalist agents or remnants of the Nationalist army. To the Communists, it seemed necessary to start a political movement among the masses to clean such remnants of feudal rule from industry in order to prepare the country for socialization. 668 467

A conference called in Hankow by the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in May 1951 initiated the "Democratic Reform" Drive among the working class in this region. The movement as defined by Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of Kwangtung Province, covered workers in four main industries: (1) public factories and enterprises; (2) shipping stevedores or dock coolies; (3) inland river transportation; and (4) private factories and enterprises. Schools and government departments did not come within its

11. Workers' Daily, Dec. 11, 1949, p. 4.